right, we could have a nonintentional evolutionary theory and a noncvolutionary theory of intentionality.
I continue to think they are both wrong. The apparent differe nces between adaptationist theorizing in biology and intcntionalist theorizing in psychology are due, in my view, to the huge differences in time scal e, and -more evident in th e discussions of both Ringen and Bennett -a downplaying of th e importance of the implications of the ubiquitous idealizing assumptions in both enterprises. '''hen we grasp the nettle and confront the ineliJllinable "practical difficulties" (Ringen) that beset the evolutionary th eorist intent on distinguishing actual case s of selection for, and the parallel practical inability of the intentionalist psychologist to cash out the idealizing assumptions that permit talk (in Bennett's example) about a "class of environm ents .. . unified with help from the concept of food-getting" we see that both enterprises continue to avail themselves -quite appropriately and defensibly -of what Quine called the "dramatic idioJll"; the sense-making interpretation-talk of the intentional stance. I claim that since there is just one sort of explanation going on in both quarters, the choice Ringen offers me must be rejected: Teleology is neither as illusory as his neo-Darwinians claim, nor as real and irreducible as his Aristotelian Bennett claims.
Ringen renders usefully explicit the vision of real teleology that haunts current thinking both in evolutionary theory and in philosophy of mind -where I have in mind particularly Dretske's (1986; 1988b) quest for a causal role for meanings . Suppose there were such a thing as a genuinely teleological system, or, equivalently, a real (as opposed to approximate or "as-if") intentional system: "Teleological principles proVide a ba~"dicting what r e},pklI'ts new circumstan 6 a syst~mJ'\'hich confol rns to th em \ 'ill produce" (Ringen, para. 5; see also Bel11 e tt , sect. 7, I ut note also that B n. t . cognizes this t~ be too ' . ealized, because of the omnipresent possibili~1 rror). Such a system would not just happen to track appropriat~ness ; it would do so in a principled way. It would be caused, in Dretske's view, to track meanings in an appropriate way. But there are no such svste ms , human or otherwise . There are onlv better and \~orse approximations of this ideal -which i~ rather like the ideal of a frictionless bearing, or a perfectly failsafe alarm system. As Ringen points out, the process of natural selection does not quite measure up as a teleological system . Selection itself can only filter, at best supporting the conditional: If the appropriate sort of variation is generated, it will be selected . The generation proce ss that pro\'ide s the candidates for sorting itself is deemed by orthodoxy to be unresponsive to appropriateness. So there can be no guarantee, or anything even close to a guarantee, of genuine "teleological" or meaning-tracking behavior in evolution. I agree, then, with the passage Ringen quotes from Lewontin (1979) : "The dynamics of natural selection docs not include foreSight , and there is no theoretical principle that assures optimization as a conseque ncc of selection."
Both Ringen and Bennett would like to accept the invited contrast of this orthodox view of evolution with a design process controlled by an Intelligent Artificer (or just an intelligent arti/lcer -an everyday, fore sightful inte ntional s\'stem such as an engineer). '''hen we look c1osch' at thl: contrast however do we disco\'er <1n\'thin"
• » • ~ but differences in degree? Some engineers are doltish and , habit-bound; if a particular design solution happens to .
occur to them, they will adopt it, but there is no guarantee .
that they will generate the move that we can see in i
hindsight is the appropriate move in the circumstances . . Some engineers are much cleverer, and some have pos-I itively brilliant insights into the reasons for and against I I particular design proposals. How adroit, how flexible, how sensitive must a system be to these reasons for it to be I a rcal intentional svstem? Bennett's "unity ~ondition" is supposed to answer this t question: Ifuthe class of environments is unified with help : from the concept of behaving in a man ner appropriate" to ' this or that feature , th'en we are entitled to attribute that t concept to that system, not as a fQ(;oll de parler but literally. But one theorist's unifying concept is another I theorist's inflationary shorthand for a mere disjunction of ; tropisms (cf. Dretske (1986) and Dennett 1987, eh. 8) . . Bennett in effect concedes this, for he casts his question in terms of when we may hypothesize that there are going to be more disjuncts than we have observed: "\\1hat can make it all right for us to trust an intentional or teleologi-; cal generalization to I~ s fro some S-M linkages to predict others?" (sect. ~ara. 3 Bennett suggests that either hypotheses about ~ti n or learning or both could underlie our confidence that one way or another there were mechanisms in an organism (or artifact) that would tend to yield further appropriate linkages. I agree (see Dennett 1990a; 1990b; 1991b) , and I do not see (yet) why Bennett claims that his view in this regard is "quite different from" what I have been saying. I think Ringen's optimism about the independent application of optimality principles in evolutionary theory is . similarly undercut. In discussing the case of the sexually reproducing snails' response to the castrating trematode parasite, for instance, he says: "Optimality principles predict that such optimal traits will emerge." I think not. Optimality principles predict that either such optimal traits will emerge or they will not; in the latter case, either the parasites will secure their 0"\'11 extinction by the extinction of their non adapting hosts, or some semistable exploitation cycle will persist indefinitely. There are no guarantees, only the rationales of hinds4ght. But do not knock hindsight; one way or another, it is the only sort of sight we can ever count on having. At our best, our adaptive mechanisms lag slightly behind reality, tracking it ever more doggedly, but never giving us a "principle" by which we might predict genuinely teleological activity.
Finally, I will comment all too briefly on some of Bennett's other constructive criticisms and objections. Bennett corrects my interpretation of his views on Quine's 1960 indeterminacy thesis . The view he and Blackburn (1975) hold had not occurred to me, and I have no opinion, yet, on whether, as he claims, determinacy of language is consistent with indeterminacy of thoughts .
Bennett describes my view of intentional attribution as "free-ranging, somewhat haphazard" since it is governed by only "two extremely mild constraints": a rationality assumption and a prohibition of inflationary attributions. He claims that, on the contrary, "a good deal of discipline" can be brought to bear on the project. I have no quarrel with the details of his sketched example (the animal's food-seeking behavior); I just think the considerations he correctly raises are subsumed under my constraints, which are not mild at all. There is plenty of structure to the reasoning processes that govern the postulation and support of intentional attributions, and it is generated, indirectly, by my minimal constraints.
I think Bennett misunderstands the strategy of my vending machin e example. H e is not alon e, so it is my fault. He is right that the vending machin e is even worse than th e th erm ostat as an example of an intentional syste m -that was deliberate on my part. I wanted to choose an example of a dead-simple, quasipen:eptual mechanism (th e (:Ounterfeit-coin detector) so there would be no controversy about "what we would say"; of course there is no deep fact of the matter in this instance about which cases of coin-rejection count as "errors." Any grounds for calling some cases errors and others proper fun ctioning will have to depend on the em bedding of the device in a large context of purposes : the purposes of its users . Th e chall e nge is then for the believers in deepe r facts about content in fancier cases (Twin Earth cases in particular) to show what feature s of these fancier cases pe~mit us to invoke other principles . I claim they cannot, and I do not see that Bennett's discussion provides any such grounds. Bennett says we do not have to solve the problem of e rror for the ve ndin g machine. We do not hat;e to solve the problem of error for anything; we can always ("in principle") esch ew intentional discourse and settle for brute physical stance mechanism . But if we find it illuminating to adopt th e intentional stan ce (and even in the ease of the vendin g machine, the error-talk is illuminating -just think of th e design-improve ment process, the invocation of Gresham's Law, etc.), we will find ourselves invoking th e minimal but non e-too-mild constraints of th e intentiollal stance.
